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Since the early 1990s, there has undoubtedly been an increase in euroskepticism, both
among national political parties and among the general public. The literature has identi-
fied two general causes—concerns over national identity and utilitarian cost/benefit analy-
ses. Originally, utilitarian concerns were thought to be the primary motivator, but research
post-Maastricht introduced the idea that citizens’ national identity may also be a driver. Re-
cent research has concluded that, indeed, both are strong predictors of euroskepticism. But
which offers more insight into the motivations behind euroskepticism? And in a broader
sense, how does the issue of “Europe” relate to the more well-established cleavages along
with political parties compete? Drawing on data from the 2010 Chapel Hill Expert Survey
and utilizing OLS regression, I attempt to answer these questions. Overall, I find that na-
tional identity concerns—rather than socioeconomic concerns—are the more potent predic-
tor of euroskeptic tendencies. But more importantly, I demonstrate that competition over
European integration has been largely integrated into the broader cultural and economic
cleavages that define domestic political competition.
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Introduction
Until the 1990s, European integration was largely uncontested by the public; integration
was characterized by the well-known “permissive consensus” (Lindberg and Scheingold
1970). Since the 1990s, however, public skepticism of the European Project has continually
increased. The Dutch and French rejections of the Constitutional Treaty show this trend to
be true even among the original signatories to the Treaty of Rome, considered until recently
to be the most “euro-positive” states. Now, Europe has entered a stage of “constraining
dissensus,” in which the public’s support for new stages of integration can no longer be
taken for granted (Hooghe and Marks 2008). Both the general public as well as political
elites are becoming increasingly skeptical of the European Project1 .
But, what are the mechanisms driving this recent upsurge in euroskepticism? The lit-
erature on euroskepticism and public opinion has identified two general theoretical strains:
national identity and socioeconomic. The national identity strain suggests that the pub-
lic’s support for European integration (or lack thereof) is largely a factor of their national
identity (Hooghe and Marks 2005). Other authors have expanded upon this to suggest that
citizen’s perceptions of a threat to their national identity, either from the EU itself or from
other groups, also strongly influences their support for integration (McLaren 2002, 2007;
de Vries and van Kersbergen 2007). In contrast, the socioeconomic strain argues that sup-
port for integration is a function of cost/benefit analysis—citizens are more likely to support
integration if it results in a net benefit to either the national economy or their own pocket-
books (Carrubba 1997; Gabel 1998). As recent scholarship has shown, however, it takes
both strains working in conjunction to adequately explain euroskepticism (McLaren 2002;
1 For a more complete explanation of the cueing effects linking party and public opinions, see “Calculation,
Community and Cues: Public Opinion on European Integration” (Hooghe and Marks 2005) and “Who’s
Cueing Whom? Mass-Elite Linkages and the Future of European Integration” (Steenbergen, Edwards and
de Vries 2007).
Hooghe 2003; Krouwel and Abts 2007; de Vries and van Kersbergen 2007). This article will
empirically test the extent to which various concerns about identity and utilitarian benefits
influence party political support for European integration. It will also attempt to ascertain
whether national identity or rational/utilitarian concerns is the stronger indicator of eu-
roskepticism. In general, I hypothesize that greater tangible benefits from integration—i.e.
positive utilitarian outcomes—should lead to greater support for integration. In particular,
I expect the global financial crisis and the eurocrisis to be a highly significant predictor of
euroskepticism.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. First, I will present a general
overview of what is meant by “euroskepticism.” Next, I will elaborate on the idea of na-
tionalism, and present the dominant theoretical arguments as to how nationalist sentiment
drives opposition to European integration. Then, I will detail the contrasting theories of the
rational/utilitarian argument. In the fourth section, I will present my hypotheses and general
research design. In the fifth section, I will examine the validity of those theories using data
from the 2010 Chapel Hill Expert Survey. Finally, I will conclude with a discussion of the
implications of my findings.
What is Euroskepticism?
Given the recent rise of the public’s constraining dissensus with regard to integration,
the term “euroskepticism” has become something of a buzzword throughout Brussels, the
media, national politics, and even academia. It has, in effect, become an umbrella term
for all anti-EU sentiments, whether that is merely skepticism at the current policies or the
outright rejection of the entire project of integration. Thus, it is first necessary to define
what euroskepticism means. Paul Taggart (1998) identifies three major positions within
the umbrella of euroskepticism. Firstly, there is anti-integration—those who oppose the
entire idea of integration and, consequently, the whole concept of the EU. Secondly, there
are those who are not, in principle, opposed to integration but who are skeptical that the
EU is the best means of achieving this goal because they see the Union as too inclusive.
Simply put, they believe that the EU is trying to force together too many disparate elements
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to truly function as a cohesive unit. And thirdly, there are those who are not opposed to
integration but who are skeptical of the EU because they see it as too exclusive. According
to Taggart, this exclusivity can be either geographical or societal. For example, this group
could oppose the EU because it excludes poorer regions of the world or because they see
the EU as destabilizing to traditional societal groups.
For the purposes of this article, I use the term “euroskepticism” in the same way as
Taggart (1998, 366):
“The term ‘Euroscepticism’ is. . . an encompassing term. [It] expresses the idea
of contingent or qualified opposition, as well as incorporating outright and un-
qualified opposition to the process of European integration. The justification
for using the broad term Euroscepticism, apart from its popular usage, is that it
exists, albeit in a variety of guises, in the face of an on-going de facto process
of integration at the institutional and elite level. The context is one of Euro-
pean integration, and so the term Euroscepticism encompasses those who stand
outside the status quo. Scepticism in the face of an institutional reality is here
taken as equivalent to opposition in the face of uncertainty. It is also used be-
cause it is more inclusive. All opponents of the EU are, at least, sceptical, but
not all sceptics are opponents.”
This inclusive definition of euroskepticism is salient not only due to the reasons Taggart
proposes, but also due to the limitations of the data used for this study. While there are
undoubtedly parties within the dataset that oppose the very idea of European integration,
the data do not differentiate those parties from those that are merely highly skeptical of the
EU2 . Thus, I have utilized a broad definition for two reasons—firstly, to avoid being forced
to make a purely value based-judgment as to which parties are and are not euroskeptic, and
secondly, to extend the theoretical applicability of this study to the maximal number of po-
litical parties. To that end, I have chosen to measure euroskepticism using the continuous
scale of the Chapel Hill Expert Survey3 . Such a continuous scale has many virtues, but
2 Taggart goes on the distinguish “hard” euroskeptics—those who oppose the very idea of integration—
from “soft” euroskeptics—those who are merely skeptical about integration. As noted, the Chapel Hill Expert
Survey does not make this distinction. However, Leonard Ray has suggested that when combining Taggart’s
hard and soft euroskepticism with the 7-point scale utilized by the Chapel Hill Expert Survey, hard euroskep-
tics would fall from 1–2.49 and soft euroskeptics would fall from 2.5–4 (Hooghe 2007).
3 A more detailed description of this scale can be found in the Research Design section of this paper.
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chief among them is the ability to gain a more nuanced representation of euroskeptic posi-
tions than would be possible using a categorical scale. Secondly, the continuous measure
alleviates the need for the researcher to make arbitrary judgments concerning the cutoff
points between categories.
National Identity
Previous research has established that there is a definite link between national iden-
tity and support for European integration (McLaren 2002; Bruter 2004; Hooghe and Marks
2005; Brigevich 2012). These studies have demonstrated that nested, inclusive national
identities foster support for a European identity and, in turn, support for European integra-
tion. With such an identity, a citizen can easily conceive of herself as being both “German”
and “European.” These identities are not mutually exclusive, and indeed, there is evidence
to suggest that the nested nature of such identities may be self-reinforcing (Brigevich 2012).
Conversely, however, national identity may be non-nested and exclusive. In such a case, a
citizen would hypothetically perceive herself to be either “German” or “European4 ;” the
levels would be mutually exclusive.
Nationalism
At the core of the exclusive national identity strain is the concept of nationalism.
Michael Hechter (2000, 7) provides a preliminary definition of nationalism: “collective
action designed to render the boundaries of the nation congruent with those of its gover-
nance unit.” In other words, nationalism seeks to make the borders of the nation the same
as those of the state. In its more benign forms, nationalism may use inclusive policies to
incorporate and assimilate different groups within a single, multicultural state. Those with
an inclusive, multi-faceted national identity should look favorably upon further integration,
and thus express lower levels of euroskepticism (Hooghe and Marks 2005). However, na-
tionalism more often takes an exclusive approach. It seeks to create a monocultural state
4 In most cases, citizens tend to identify with national or regional identities before they identify with a
European identity.
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through internal homogenization and external exclusiveness (Mudde 2007). Internal ho-
mogenization “ensures that the state includes only people from one’s ‘own’ nation,” while
external exclusiveness “aims to bring all members of the nation within the territory of the
state” (Mudde 2007, 16).
Hechter’s definition incorporates only state-centered nationalism, however, numerous
studies have shown that nationalism also has a strong cultural (alternatively referred to as
an ethnic or racial) component (McLaren 2002; Hooghe and Marks 2005; Mudde 2007).
As Cas Mudde (2007, 17) notes, in practice, nationalism includes a combination of both
state and cultural nationalism. By expanding the definition to include ethno-cultural com-
ponents, nationalism can begin to account for those parties (or citizens) that are opposed to
integration because they feel culturally threatened by the homogenization that often goes
hand-in-hand with deeper integration.
Nativism
It would not be accurate, however, to say that all levels of nationalist sentiment envis-
age an attack upon one’s sense of cultural identity. Thus, a more nuanced examination of
nationalism is needed in order to understand the relationship between nationalism and a
rejection of the European Project because of a perceived threat to one’s culture. By dif-
ferentiating between more “moderate” nationalist sentiment and “radical” nationalist (i.e.
nativist5 ) sentiment, one is able to more thoroughly understand the connection between the
perceived threat to national identity and euroskepticism (Mudde 2007, 17).
For this study, nativism is defined as “an ideology [that] holds that states should be
inhabited exclusively by members of the native group (‘the nation’) and that nonnative
elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the homogeneous nation-
state” (Mudde 2007, 19). “The nation,” much like the rest of society, is an artificial construct
5 As Mudde (2007, 17) notes, nativism is typically found in the study of American politics and is rarely
applied to European parties. In the American context, the term has distinctly economic overtones, and typi-
cally involves the rejection of immigrant groups based on overtly economic concerns (e.g. loss of jobs). In a
European context, however, this term would need to be broadened to include rejection of immigrant groups
for non-economic concerns as well.
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(Anderson 1983); it is fluid and constantly changing. Nevertheless, nativists assume that
the nation, however it is constructed, is correct and must be protected. Central to a nativist6
worldview is the delineation of the world into “good” (us, the Nation) and “bad” (them,
the Other) (Mudde 2007). Cas Mudde (2007, 74) identifies several different forms that this
worldview commonly takes, however, the most salient are fears of that which is “outside the
state and outside the nation.” This category can include neighboring states or ethnic groups,
ideas or beliefs, or international organizations such as the EU or UN. For the nativist, this
group looms as the largest potential threat to the homogeneity of the nation—this category
is neither of the state nor of the nation and, as such, has the best possibility of disrupting
the nativists eagerly sought-after homogeneity.
With specific regard to the EU, the large post-Maastricht uptick in euroskepticism seems
to have been driven in large part by nativist sentiments. For many citizens and political
parties, the Maastricht Treaty took the idea of European integration a step too far; it was
now beginning to infringe upon the sovereignty of the nation-state (Eichenberg and Dalton
2007; Krouwel and Abts 2007; Mudde 2007). These sentiments, ultimately, led to the now
infamous defeat of Constitutional Treaty in 2005.
Socioeconomic Concerns
The second major strain of research into euroskepticism deals with socioeconomic con-
cerns. This is, by far, the less theoretically complicated line of reasoning. At its core, these
utilitarian arguments assume that citizens and parties implicitly weigh the costs and benefits
of European integration. When the costs outweigh the benefits, there will be less support
for integration and vice versa (Carrubba 1997; Gabel 1998; McLaren 2002; Boomgaarden,
Shuck, Elenbaas and de Vreese 2011).
One of the primary expressions of these utilitarian considerations is in economic terms.
Matthew Gabel (1998) argues that the liberalization of EU markets through European in-
tegration affects citizens of different educational and socioeconomic backgrounds in dif-
6 For a complete discussion of nativism, see Mudde 2007, chapter 3.
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ferent ways. Low income, low skill workers are often negatively affected by integration;
conversely, high income, high skill workers are often able to capitalize on market liber-
alization to significant personal benefit. In addition, liberalization of capital markets will
adversely affect low-income workers by making it easier for capital to move to productive
areas. Thus, it becomes harder to force capital-owners to accede to demands to main-
tain the high wages upon which these low-income workers depend. Finally, Gabel argues
that proximity to a border with another EU member will prove beneficial due to increased
economic interaction between neighboring countries. Thus, Gabel presents a set of clear
“winners”—high-income, high-skill workers; the wealthy; those living near borders—and
“losers”—low-income, low-skill workers; the poor; those living away from borders—from
integration. Given this dichotomy of economic winners and losers, it is possible to infer
party support for integration based off their expected “median voter.” For parties whose
median voter falls into the “economic winner” category, we can expect a stronger support
for integration; conversely, parties whose median voter falls into the “economic losers”
category should display less support for integration.
Similarly, Clifford Carrubba (1997) identifies national “winners” and “losers” from in-
tegration. Specifically, he examines net national contributions to the EU budget to show
that transfer payments from the Union are often used to further the integration process. He
shows that budget contributions reflect the domestic concerns within each state, and refutes
the notion that transfer payments are made out of “fairness” whereby the richer states give
a “helping hand” to the poorer states (Carrubba 1997, 469). Unsurprisingly, he finds that
states that give more to the EU budget than they receive—i.e. are net-contributors—tend to
be less supportive of integration, while states that receive more from the Union than they
give—i.e. are net-recipients—tend to be more supportive of integration.
Finally, the literature on euroskepticism has long acknowledged that concerns over
national economic performance are a strong indicator of euroskeptic tendencies (Eichen-
berg and Dalton 1993; Carrubba 1997). This theory—known as the sociotropic economic
explanation—focuses on indicators such as national growth rates, unemployment levels, net
contributions to the EU budget, and subjective “perceptions of economic performance” to
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predict levels of euroskepticism. Unsurprisingly, Serricchio, Tsakatika and Quaglia (2013,
58) acknowledges that those countries most detrimentally affected by the global financial
crisis—namely Greece, Portugal, Ireland, and Spain—experienced a sharp rise in euroskep-
ticism from 2007-2010; they are now showing roughly the same levels of euroskepticism
as the historically “euroskeptic” countries such as Austria, Denmark, or the UK. Thus, it
seems highly plausible that this recent spike in euroskepticism among formerly europositive
states is due, at least in part, to the financial crisis.
Regional Axes
Beyond the broader concerns over cultural identity and socioeconomic factors, eu-
roskepticism is (or at least, has historically been) structured along differing axes for Western
and Eastern Europe (Marks, Hooghe, Nelson and Edwards 2006).
In Western Europe, support for European integration has long been bipolar—the cen-
ter generally supports integration while both ends of the political spectrum are generally
opposed. A more nuanced understanding of this relationship can be gained by disaggregat-
ing support for integration into two separate components. On the one hand, the left/right
economic spectrum; on the other hand, a social politics spectrum ranging from socially
“liberal” to socially conservative (Marks et al. 2006). Parties on the extreme left of the
economic spectrum typically consider the EU to be too market-oriented, while parties on
the extreme economic right believe that the EU interferes too much in the proper function-
ing of the markets. On the social spectrum, the extreme “liberals” do not believe that the
EU goes far enough to champion issues such as minority rights and environmental protec-
tion, while extreme social conservatives believe that the EU goes too far in defending such
issues. Thus, the extremes of both spectrums tend to be euroskeptic.
Such a bipolar relationship has not historically existed in Eastern Europe, however.
As Milada Vachudova and Liesbet Hooghe (2009) argue, support for integration in the
East has been unipolar, caught between the pull of two “magnets.” At one end of the
political spectrum, there is the historically strong but weakening pull of the communist
legacy that combines egalitarian views on economic rights with traditionalist, nationalist
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social preferences. After the fall of communism, many parties throughout Eastern Europe
rejected these views and embraced the EU and market liberalism. Thus,at the other end of
the political spectrum is the slightly weaker but growing constellation of pro-market, pro-
Europe, cosmopolitanism. The supporters of the old communist ideals rejected this new
system, and with it, European integration.
These alignments have been resilient across time, however, they may now be changing,
particularly in the East. After 25 years of political competition and free-market economics,
the communist legacy no longer exerts the pull that it once did. Thus I hypothesize that party
competition, particularly competition over European integration, in the East is aligning
more closely with the bipolar structure seen in the West.
Research Design
Data
To test the validity of these theoretical strains, I utilize the 2010 Chapel Hill Expert
Survey (CHES) data (Bakker, de Vries, Edwards, Hooghe, Jolly, Marks, Polk, Rovney,
Steenbergen and Vachudova 2012) and OLS regressions. The CHES measures national
political party positioning on European integration, party ideology, and several of the most
salient EU and non-EU policies (e.g. cohesion policy, enlargement to Turkey, positioning
towards the United States). These data place political parties on both a traditional economic
left-right spectrum as well the GalTan spectrum of societal values—the so-called “new
politics dimension” (Hooghe, Marks and Wilson 2002). A more detailed explanation of the
economic left-right and the GalTan spectrums is provided below.
I chose these data for a number of reasons, not least of which is the proven reliability
of expert surveys on accurately measuring party positioning (Hooghe, Bakker, Brigevich,
de Vries, Edwards, Marks, Rovney, Steenbergen and Vachudova 2010). These data include
the political parties of all 28 EU Member States (with the exceptions of Cyprus, Malta,
and Luxembourg) as well as Norway and Switzerland. Thus, almost the entire population
of European political parties is represented by these data. It should be noted that I do not
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use the raw data in this study; rather, I utilize the “means” version in which the individual
expert responses for each party have been aggregated.
Many scholars of the Sussex School of Euroskepticism7 (for instance, Aleks Szczer-
biak, Paul Taggart, and Cas Mudde) have criticized the “experts” utilized in the CHES.
They contend that, rather than a true expert survey, the CHES is merely a peer survey of
scholars in the field, and thus, does not provide a truly valid description of party positions
(Mudde 2012). Mudde (2012, 197) notes that the “true experts of the Sussex School” are
often divided over what is and is not euroskepticism, thus, he views the assertions about
the general agreement among CHES respondents on the positioning of parties as “overly
optimistic.” Semantic differences aside, the CHES has been compared to other party po-
sitioning datasets such as the Comparative Manifesto Project and the European Elections
Study survey, and has been found to be just as accurate and reliable in predicting party
positioning (Hooghe et al. 2010; Bakker et al. 2012).
Variables
I will begin with a discussion of the dependent variable—position on European integration—
and will then discuss the independent variables used in the study. The explanatory variables
have been grouped into three general categories—general controls, national identity, and
socioeconomic factors. Table 1 summarizes the main variables in this study for Western
Europe. Similarly, Table 2 does the same for Eastern Europe. More detailed descriptions
of all the variables can be found in the following sections.
7 For a more in-depth comparison of the Sussex and North Carolina Schools, see Mudde (2012).
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Table 1: Western Europe: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Position on Integration 4.600 1.736 1 7 144
GalTan 4.732 2.552 0.167 9.667 144
Econ. Left-Right 4.635 2.309 0.091 9.182 144
GalTan Extremism 6.481 6.352 0 25.593 144
Econ. Extremism 5.346 5.283 0.02 22.717 144
Inclusiveness 0 0.923 -1.634 1.952 144
Socio-Economic Policies 0 0.888 -1.922 1.8 144
Length of EU Membership 38.872 18.663 6 58 125
Dissent within Party 2.668 1.388 0.091 7 144
Salience of the EU 2.746 0.514 1.3 4 144
Party Size 12.121 11.564 0.2 43.9 123
Net EU Beneficiary 0.347 0.478 0 1 144
GDP Growth Rate 1.719 2.197 -5.4 6 144
Note: Net EU Beneficiary is an indicator variable with a value of 0 if a country gave more
money to the EU budget than it received from the EU and a value of 1 if the opposite is
true.
Table 2: Eastern Europe: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Position on Integration 5.297 1.358 1.667 6.857 89
GalTan 5.612 2.316 1.412 9.538 89
Econ. Left-Right 4.832 1.851 0.333 8.571 89
GalTan Extremism 5.31 5.364 0 16.909 89
Econ. Extremism 3.447 4.241 0 18.063 89
Inclusiveness 0 0.879 -1.647 1.747 89
Socio-Economic Policies 0 0.92 -2.464 1.989 78
Length of EU Membership 5.385 1.219 3 6 78
Dissent within Party 2.756 1.307 0.5 7 89
Salience of the EU 2.825 0.58 1.286 4 89
Party Size 13.14 11.691 0.8 52.73 74
GDP Growth Rate 1.242 2.143 -2.9 4.8 89
Note: Net EU Beneficiary was not included in the regressions for Eastern Europe be-
cause all Eastern European countries are net beneficiaries.
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Dependent Variable
The dependent variable for this study is a measure of positioning on European integra-
tion. The expert respondents were asked to place each party on a seven-point scale in which
1 signifies that the party is “strongly opposed” to integration, 2 is “opposed,” 3 is “some-
what opposed,” 4 is a neutral position, 5 is “somewhat in favor,” 6 is “in favor,” and 7 is
“strongly in favor.” Scores below 4 are considered to be euroskeptic.
The levels of support for integration range from Estonia and Romania at the high end
(each with scores just under 6) to Greece and Norway on the low end (each with scores of
about 3.75). Of the 233 parties included in the dataset, approximately 23% score below a 4
while approximately 68% score above a 4. Furthermore, 50% of the parties fall into the two
most supportive categories. The mean value is 4.8 and the standard deviation is 1.6, further
indicating that most parties are actually supportive of integration and that only a small plu-
rality are euroskeptic. This does not, however, help explain which parties are euroskeptic
and which are not. When parties are arranged on an ideological left-right spectrum, how-
ever, a pattern becomes immediately clear—those parties on the far-left and far-right are the
most euroskeptic while the parties of the center are the most supportive of integration. For
instance, the far-left Greek Communist Party and far-right UKIP and FN all display strong
levels of euroskepticism, while the centrist German SPD, CDU, and British Labour Party
are all highly supportive of European integration. Interestingly, although it is a center-right
party, the British Conservatives are also highly euroskeptic. However, this is due more to
the historically high levels of euroskepticism of all British parties than to the Conservatives
ideological position. The German CDU is a clearer example of a center-right party that is
also strongly supportive of European integration.
Independent Variables
The main independent variables in this study all attempt to capture the cultural and
economic influences on euroskepticism. In the broadest sense, these variables attempt to
paint a picture of each party’s sense of its nation—what should the nation look like and
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what values should the nation as a whole hold?
The first two variables in this group measure each party’s position on the GalTan spec-
trum and the left-right economic spectrum. The first, the GalTan spectrum, places parties in
terms of their ideological stance on democratic freedoms and rights. “Green, Alternative,
Liberal” parties typically support more expansive person freedoms—greater civil liberties,
same-sex marriage, a greater role for citizens in governing, etc. Conversely, parties on
the “Traditional, Authoritarian, Nationalism” spectrum reject these ideas, favoring instead
law and order, tradition, the belief that the government should be a strong moral authority,
etc. (Marks et al. 2006). The second variable of interest is a measure of each party’s po-
sition on an economic left-right spectrum. Parties on the economic left typically support
an active role for government in the economy, while parties on the economic right empha-
size more neoliberal economic policies—privatization, lower taxes, deregulation, reduced
government spending, etc.
Both the GalTan and economic left-right variables are measured on a 0–10 scale. Scores
of 0 indicate the extreme Gal/left for both variables, scores of 10 indicate the extreme
Tan/right, and scores of 5 indicate centrist positions. The mean on the economic left-right
spectrum is 4.7 while the mean on the GalTan spectrum is 5.1. On the economic spectrum,
the extreme left receive scores from 0–1.5, the greens and social democrats are generally
located between 2–5, while the Christian democrats, liberals, and extreme right are found
from 6–10.
At the core of the theory, however, is not a party’s general position along either the social
or the economic spectrums. Rather, it is how extreme each party’s position is compared
to the median. Therefore, I created measures of party extremism for both the social and
economic dimensions by squaring each party’s distance from the median on the respective
dimension.
While both the baseline and extremism measures can accurately measure party position-
ing, none of them say much to the issues of cultural identity or socioeconomic policy pref-
erence. As mentioned earlier, one of the most potent predictors of support for integration is
whether one possesses an inclusive or exclusive identity. I chose to model the underlying
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concepts of inclusiveness and socioeconomic preferences by utilizing Cronbach’s alpha to
derive a scale that taps into these latent concepts. A full breakdown of all the loading factors
for both the cultural and economic scales can be found in the appendix.
The measure of inclusiveness utilizes social policies that all load strongly together—for
example, the party’s stance on inclusion of ethnic groups; the party’s stance on social is-
sues like homosexuality and abortion; and the party’s stance on integration of immigrant
groups—to approximate the overall level of cultural inclusiveness. In general, lower values
on this scale indicate a preference for inclusive policies while higher values denote support
for more exclusionary policies. Similarly, a general scale measuring each party’s socioe-
conomic preferences was also created by combining issues such as the party’s support for
deregulation, stance toward the internal market, and preference for economic redistribution.
Smaller values on this scale indicate socioeconomic preferences that are more “leftist”—
support for the internal market, support for governmental oversight of the economy, and
support for economic redistribution—while higher values indicate an economic“rightist”
identity.
A measure of the length of time (in years) that each party’s country has been a member
of the EU is also included. As was mentioned earlier, various studies have shown that the
length of EU membership has an impact on levels of euroskepticism, though this effect is
not linear. This pattern has held relatively constant through time, though small fluctuations
were observed after the ratification of the Maastricht Treat. However, it was only with the
attempt to pass the Constitutional Treaty in 2005 and the financial crisis in 2008 that large
shifts began occurring.
The remaining variables in the study are general controls to account for various charac-
teristics of the party and each country. The first is a measure of each party’s internal dissent
over the issue of integration. Hooghe and Marks (2005) and Steenbergen, Edwards and
de Vries (2007) have shown that parties that are more divided on integration also tend to be
more euroskeptic. This variable is measured on a 0–10 scale in which 0 indicates that the
party is totally unified while 10 indicates that it is completely divided over the issue of inte-
gration. 25% of all parties fall at or below a 1.7 while 75% of parties fall at or below a 3.5;
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the mean value is a 2.7 and the standard deviation is 1.3. Taken together, this indicates that
there is very little disagreement over integration among the majority of parties—party elites
overwhelmingly agree on whether the party should be supportive or skeptical of integration.
The next two general controls are a measure of the salience of the EU to the party’s over-
all platform in 2010 and a measure of party size. These variables are intended to control for
the effects of single-issue and fringe parties. As mentioned before, the strongest euroskeptic
sentiments often arise from the extreme ends of the political spectrum and often manifest
in smaller parties that have little broad appeal beyond their specific niche. Salience is mea-
sured on a 4-point scale ranging from “no importance” to “great importance.” The party
size8 is measured using the share of the vote that each party received in the most recent
national election to the test date—i.e., the most recent national election to 2010.
The final two variables in this section attempt to account for country-level variations.
As was mentioned in previous sections, the underlying concept of the socioeconomic strain
is a rational, cost/benefit analysis—in essence, does the party in question feel that its nation
has seen material benefits to EU integration. The first of these variables is a country-level
indicator of each country’s net contribution to the 2010 EU budget9 and the second is the
percent change in GDP growth in 201010 .
As Carrubba (1997) indicates, net-recipients to the budget should display stronger sup-
port for integration while net-contributors should display less support for integration. There
is little indication in previous studies that the magnitude of the money received from the EU
impacts euroskeptic tendencies; the country simply needs to be a net-recipient of EU funds.
Consequently, this variable was coded as a dummy indicating whether or not a country was
a net-recipient in 2010.
The second country-level variable is a measure of national economic performance. GDP
8 Data on party size were retrieved from www.parlgov.org on 20 February 2015.
9 The budgetary data were drawn from the 2010 annual operating budget of the Commission as recorded
in the 2010 Financial Report (European Commission 2010).
10 GDP growth data were retrieved from Eurostat (http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat) on 20 February 2015.
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data were taken from Eurostat and attempt to gauge the impact of the financial crisis on each
state. As was mentioned earlier in the paper, national economic performance is thought to
be a strong predictor of euroskepticism. Thus, countries that were negatively impacted by
the financial crisis—i.e. saw their GDP contract—should be less supportive of integration.
Results and Discussion
I utilize OLS regressions to test the effects of the independent variables on parties’ po-
sitions regarding integration. Clustered standard errors were used to account for variance at
the country-level. As both Marks et al. (2006) and Vachudova and Hooghe (2009) showed,
larger parties have a larger impact on the overall party competition. Thus, in addition to
controlling for party size, all models were weighted by the vote share for each party in the
most recent national election to 2010.
As mentioned before, it is also well established that the economic and GalTan spectrums
operate differently in the East than in the West. Thus, separate regressions were run on
Western and Eastern parties. Finally, three versions of the model were run for Western and
Eastern Europe—one version contains the baseline variables measuring general ideological
placement (i.e. GalTan and economic left/right), another models party extremism, while
the final model contains the measures of inclusiveness and socioeconomic preferences.
The majority of the following discussion will focus on the six different measures of
social and economic issues, however, other relevant findings will be mentioned at the end
of the section.
Table 3 summarizes the results of the models for Western parties. As the results indicate,
the models for Western parties performed largely as expected. Holding all other factors
constant, the average party should be between “neutral” and “somewhat in favor” regarding
European integration.
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Length of EU 0.009 0.016 0.006
Membership (.0119) (.0118) (.0125)
Dissent within Party -0.032 -0.117 -0.028
(.118) (.131) (.114)
Salience of the EU -0.016 -0.325 0.134
(.319) (.274) (.326)
Party Size 0.038∗∗∗ 0.024 0.030∗∗
(.009) (.013) (.009)
Net EU Beneficiary 0.989 1.859∗∗ 0.836
(.485) (.531) (.453)
GDP Growth Rate 0.213∗ 0.267∗∗ 0.139
(.088) (.083) (.095)
Intercept 4.110∗∗ 5.579∗∗∗ 3.513∗
(1.31) (1.03) (1.29)
N 104 104 104
R2 0.402 0.420 0.471
adj. R2 0.352 0.371 0.427
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Note: Clustered standard errors in parentheses. All models weighted by
vote share.
The results from the cultural and economic baselines tend to confirm previous findings.
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Parties which are economically leftist and Tan tend to be the most euroskeptic. This is to
be expected. The EU has historically been a market liberalizing project and has largely
championed “progressive” social issues such as multiculturalism, minority rights, etc. It
must be stressed, however, that these trends are not linear. As Model 2 indicates, social
and economic extremism are negatively related to support for integration. While the polit-
ical center is supportive of integration, the extreme ends of both the economic and social
spectrums are typically euroskeptic.
The results from the derived alpha-scales on inclusiveness and economic policies also
performed as expected, and may even be better predictors of euroskepticism than the more
generalized ideological or extremism indicators. While neither of these variables can be
interpreted on a per-unit-increase basis, their general indications hold with the findings
from the broader ideological scales. Having an inclusive identity continues to be one of the
strongest predictors of support for integration. As one moves toward the exclusive end of
the identity spectrum, support for integration declines sharply. Similarly, socioeconomic
preferences prove to be a strong predictor of support for integration. Specifically, support
for integration increases sharply as a party adopts a more economically “rightist” iden-
tity. While not a perfect indicator, the adjusted R2 values indicate that, overall, the derived
alpha-scales for inclusiveness and socioeconomic preference do a substantially better job
of predicting support for integration than do the more general ideological indicators.
However, the results for party size are intriguing. While it remains true that larger parties
will be more supportive of integration, this effect is rather small. All three models indicate
that now is it entirely possible to be both large and anti-establishment. Anti-establishment
and anti-EU parties are no longer confined to the political fringes.
The findings of the economic variables were somewhat surprising as well. While it
is logical to conclude that parties in countries that are net-recipients from the EU should
be more supportive of integration, it is surprising that the economic crisis seems to have
little impact. Countries which continued to experience positive GDP growth tend to fos-
ter europositive parties. Although it garners significant media and rhetorical attention, the
financial crisis has done little to rekindle economic concerns as a driving factor of euroskep-
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ticism. One major caveat to this finding must be acknowledged, however. Namely, these
data are from 2010. At that point, the greatest impact of the debt crisis was largely confined
to Southern countries. Thus, it may be more precise to say that, in 2010, the eurocrisis had
done little to inflame euroskeptic sentiment outside of the countries already being negatively
affected by the crisis.
Table 4 summarizes the results of the models for Eastern parties. Perhaps unsurprisingly
to anyone who has studied Eastern parties, the results indicate that they do not fit theoretical
expectations quite as nicely as their Western cousins. Holding all other factors constant,
these models predict an average between “somewhat opposed” and just below “neutral”
regarding European integration.
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Length of EU -0.097 0.037 -0.066
Membership (.095) (.076) (.073)
Dissent within Party -0.239 -0.369 -0.265
(.182) (.193) (.189)
Salience of the EU 0.923∗ 1.534∗∗∗ 0.890∗
(.308) (.275) (.308)
Party Size 0.002 -0.025∗ -0.0003
(.008) (.01) (.01)
GDP Growth Rate -0.067 -0.085 -0.067
(.098) (.117) (.088)
Intercept 4.841∗∗ 3.089∗ 4.038∗∗
(1.32) (.975) (.958)
N 65 65 65
R2 0.532 0.549 0.573
adj. R2 0.475 0.493 0.520
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Note: Clustered standard errors in parentheses. All models weighted
by vote share.
Similarly to their Western cousins, the baseline indicators show that Tan parties are more
likely to be euroskeptic. In the East, the EU has taken a much more active role in “Gal”
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issues like economic protection and minority protection; thus, it is unsurprising that Tan
parties would object to these policies. Similarly, although for different historical reasons11
, economically rightist parties are also more supportive of integration. In the same vein,
social and economic extremism is again negatively related to support for integration.
The derived scales on inclusiveness and socioeconomic preferences also show similar
results. Parties with a more inclusive national identity are more likely to support integration
than are those that adopt a more exclusionary national identity. And again, parties that
identity more closely with the economic right also tend to be more supportive of integration.
Similarly to the models for Western Europe, the adjusted R2 values indicated that the alpha-
scales are a better predictor for Eastern parties than either the general ideological indicators
or purely measuring party extremism. In the East, overall, it seems that the axes of party
competition are changing. Eastern parties are aligning more closely to the Western bipolar
model, though this alignment is still rather weak.
Concluding Remarks
Over the past several decades, there has been a marked increase in euroskepticism, both
among European political elites and the general public. But what is driving this uptick
in anti-EU sentiments, and how does the issue of Europe relate to broader issues of po-
litical contestation? Significant scholarship has gone into answering these questions, and
multiple theories have been proposed. These theories can generally be divided into two
categories—those involving aspects of national identity and those involving socioeconomic
concerns. The national identity theories center around the concept of inclusive versus ex-
clusive national identity, and are a response to perceived threats to national identity. The
socioeconomic theories center on implicit cost/benefit analyses—have I or my country di-
rectly benefited from EU membership? Given the context of the ongoing global financial
crisis and the eurocrisis, it seems logical that utilitarian concerns should be a quite potent
predictor of euroskepticism.
11 For a complete explanation of the differences between Eastern and Western party alignments, see Marks
et al. 2006.
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I utilized OLS regressions to test this hypothesis. The results indicate that, while rhetor-
ically and politically important, economic concerns are very poor predictors of euroskep-
ticism. This is especially true of the eurocrisis. However, economic indicators do provide
slightly more explanatory power when examining Eastern Europe. On the whole however,
concerns over national identity remain much stronger predictors.
Two points must be kept in mind, however. Firstly, euroskeptic parties remain a numeric
minority. Although they garner significant academic and media attention, these parties are
small minority within each country. However, this study has shown that it is now possible
to be both a large, electorally-successful party and anti-EU. It can no longer be taken for
granted that strong enuroskepticism is confined to small, fringe parties.
And secondly, “Europe” is not a new or separate cleavage along which parties can com-
pete. Contestation over European integration has been successfully assimilated into the
broader cultural and economic cleavages that already define domestic political competition.
If one knows a party’s position on a range of domestic social and economic issues, it is
possible to predict that party’s stance toward integration.
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APPENDIX
Table 5: Western Europe: Inclusiveness Scale Loading Fac-
tors
Factor Obs Avg. Interitem Alpha
Correlation
Social Lifestyle 144 0.793 0.939
Religious Principle 144 0.887 0.969
Immigration 144 0.800 0.941
Multiculturalism 144 0.788 0.937
Ethnic Minorities 144 0.805 0.943
Test Scale 0.815 0.957
Table 6: Western Europe: Socio-Economic Scale Loading Factors
Factor Obs Avg. Interitem Alpha
Correlation
Internal Market 144 0.947 0.982
Spending vs. Inc. Taxes 144 0.659 0.853
Deregulation 144 0.617 0.829
Redistribution 144 0.649 0.847
Test Scale 0.718 0.911
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Table 7: Eastern Europe: Inclusiveness Scale Loading Fac-
tors
Factor Obs Avg. Interitem Alpha
Correlation
Social Lifestyle 89 0.709 0.907
Religious Principle 89 0.788 0.937
Immigration 89 0.680 0.895
Multiculturalism 89 0.665 0.888
Ethnic Minorities 89 0.740 0.919
Test Scale 0.716 0.927
Table 8: Eastern Europe: Socio-Economic Scale Loading Factors
Factor Obs Avg. Interitem Alpha
Correlation
Internal Market 78 0.925 0.974
Spending vs. Inc. Taxes 78 0.790 0.919
Deregulation 78 0.728 0.889
Redistribution 78 0.741 0.896
Test Scale 0.796 0.940
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